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The Legal Implications of the Sino-British
Treaties Regarding Hong Kong
I. INTRODUCTION
Chung-kuo, the Middle Kingdom,-this is China. Throughout
its long history as the Middle Kingdom, China has developed a civi-
lization based upon its own concept of law. In Imperial China (1550
B.C. - 1912 A.D.), Confucian philosophy served as a basis for law.
According to Confucius:
If the people be led by laws and uniformity is sought to be given
them by punishments, they will try to avoid punishments but
have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue and uniformity
sought to be given them by li, they will have a sense of shame
and, moreover, will become good.'
Consequently, during the Imperialist period, the Chinese be-
lieved that by focusing on man's virtue within society, political and
social harmony would result. The leader of the country would be a
moral and virtuous man who would seek to avoid hostilities by ne-
gotiation and compromise. It was with this philosophy that China
encountered the nineteenth century imperialist policies of the west-
ern world.
During the eighteenth century, the western nations, particularly
Britain, recognized the value of Chinese tea and silk to its trade.
However, the British had no export commodity for which there was
a demand in China. Therefore, the British paid in gold and silver.
From 1781 to 1790, British traders brought 16.4 million taels of sil-
ver into China; from 1800 to 1810, the British paid 26 million taels.
2
Trade between China and Britain remained favorable to the Chi-
nese until the 1820's, when British merchants and the East India
Company expanded the importation of opium into China. With
opium as its chief export, Britain eliminated its trade deficit; in 1836,
for the first time, China suffered a one million dollar trade deficit.
As Tan Chung observed, "Britain's China trade was no ordinary
international trade. It was colonial exploitation, remittance and
1. Tay, Law in Communist China, 6 SYDNEY L. REv. 161 (1969).
2. I. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 220 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Hsu].
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smuggling." 3 With their trade blossoming, the British sought to pro-
tect the opium traffic against the opposition of local leaders. The
Opium War and its consequences were inevitable.
China was wholly unprepared for war with any industrialized
nation, especially Britain. The Opium War lasted three years, end-
ing in 1842 with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking. The treaty's
thirteen articles opened five Chinese ports to British trade; forced a
twenty-one million dollar indemnity to Britain (including six mil-
lion dollars for destroyed opium); and imposed a fixed tariff on
China. Most importantly for purposes of this article, under Article
III, China ceded the Island of Hong Kong to Britain "to be pos-
sessed in perpetuity by her Britannick Majesty, her Heirs and Suc-
cessors. . ."4 Opium, the primary subject of the war, was not
dealt with in the treaty; however, as both Chinese and western
scholars have noted, the continuance of the opium trade was forced
upon the Chinese at gunpoint. Following the Opium War, efforts to
stop the influx of opium were futile. By 1858, under British pres-
sure, China legalized the opium trade.
From the end of the Opium War until 1949, China was a weak
country of colonial stature, humiliated by western demands to
which it was forced to accede. In international affairs and economic
development involving China's territory, resources and labor, Chi-
nese opinion and consent were ignored. There was neither a central
authority nor a powerful military force to defend China's rights and
territories. This was, for the Chinese, a century of degradation.
Since the Opium War, many changes have taken place in the
western world and in China. Following World War II, the Chinese
Communists came to power, establishing the People's Republic of
China (PRC) in 1949. The Communists focused upon the problems
of the Chinese peasantry, while in Hong Kong, a capitalist economy
and industry flourished. The rapid post-war growth of the Hong
Kong economy is attributable to the demand for Chinese manufac-
tured products. In recent years, Hong Kong's exports have exceeded
those of India. Hong Kong has developed from a simple harbor to
"refit British subjects' ships" to one of the world's greatest free ports.
It has become a major industrial and economic power in Asia.
Today, Hong Kong consists not only of the island, but includes
3. Chung, The Opium War (1840-42) and Sino-British Contradictions, 6 CHINA REPORT
38 (Mar.-Apr. 1978).
4. G.B. ENDACOTT, AN EASTERN ENTREPOT 25 (1964).
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Kowloon Peninsula, Stonecutters Island and the New Territories.
Hong Kong Island, with an area of twenty-nine square miles, was
ceded to the British in 1842, under the provisions of the Treaty of
Nanking. Following this treaty, conflicts continued between the
British and Chinese. In 1860, the British, at the Convention of Pe-
king, took control of both Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters Is-
land. China's vulnerability was apparent once again when it was
defeated by Japan in 1895. The British "recognized that an exten-
sion of Hong Kong territory [was] necessary for the proper defense
and protection of the Colony." 5 Consequently, under the terms of
the 1898 Convention of Peking, Britain was able to obtain a ninety-
nine year lease for the New Territories, located on the mainland
north of Kowloon. As Norman Miners noted, "These New Territo-
ries increased the area of the colony from 43 to 400 square miles." 6
This article considers the legal implications of the Chinese-Brit-
ish treaties concerning Hong Kong. Because the basic views of the
PRC on international law are quite antithetical to those of Britain,
and in turn, those of the western world, the focus will be on the
Chinese and British interpretations of the law of treaties; the Chi-
nese view of the law of peaceful coexistence; and Hong Kong's ra-
cial issue.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Chinese Policies After 1949
Mao Tse-tung changed China's domestic and foreign perspec-
tives and focused his ideals upon the Chinese peasantry. In order to
create a self-sufficient egalitarian China, Mao looked to the Chinese
masses. The Chinese Communist leaders directed their energies and
policies to improving the lives of the masses. Mao's social aim was
to serve the collective good-thus, the well-known slogan, "Serve
the people." Mao's philosophy centered upon the Chinese peasants,
and the Revolution itself depended for its success upon organizing
them.
Under the PRC, an ideological conflict exists between "red"
and "expert." The ideal Chinese socialist is one who is both a com-
mitted revolutionary and a political expert, i.e., one who has both a
"proletarian state of mind," and the expertise to ensure good work
5. 186 Parry's T.S. 310 (1979).
6. THE FAR EAST AND AUSTRALIA 1980-81, 402 (Europa Publications 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as THE FAR EAST].
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performance. 7 Franz Schurmann has explained that "ideological
goals" are basically "human," as compared with "technical goals"
which basically belong only to professional experts. 8 The ideologi-
cal human goals seek to resocialize the Chinese from individual ori-
entation into community orientation-to believe in community
fulfillment rather than self-fufillment. Technical goals are special-
ized goals, which require experts and enhance the position of ex-
perts, i.e., the professors, intellectuals and industrial planners in
society. The technical goal, therefore, increases expert individual-
ism.9 Although Mao stressed the need for unity between "red" and
"expert," a conflict exists between the two.
Mao envisioned a society where political ideology was a char-
acteristic that belonged not only to the peasantry but also to the
leaders and experts. Mao authoritatively expounded upon this uni-
fication in 1958:
Red and expert, politics and business--the relationship between
them is the unification of contradictions. We must criticize the
apolitical attitude .... Those who pay no attention to ideology
and politics and are busy with their work all day long, will be-
come economists or technicians who have lost their sense of di-
rection and this is very dangerous. Ideological work and political
work are the guarantee that economic and technical work will be
carried through, they serve the economic base. Ideology and
politics are the supreme commander; they are the soul. .... l0
For Mao, expertise should not be achieved at the expense of
political philosophy.
Mao further speculated that it would be necessary to continu-
ally resolve society's contradictions:
The transition from socialism to communism is a struggle, a
revolution. Even when we have reached the era of communism,
there will definitely still be many, many stages of development
and the relationship between one stage and another will necessar-
ily be a relation leading from quantitative change to qualitative
change. Every mutation or leap is a revolution. I
Accordingly, the Chinese peasants were taught that struggles
7. J. TOWNSEND, POLITICS IN CHINA 245 (1974).
8. F. SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 51-52
(1970).
9. Id.
10. J. CHEN, MAO AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION 64 (1965).
11. Id. at 65.
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could not be avoided because these struggles were necessary to
China's socialist development.
Mao felt that a better socialist society would develop through
continuous struggle. The continuous revolution focused upon insti-
tutions. The social and cultural institutions with feudal and bour-
geois remnants were to be destroyed and then rebuilt to conform to
Mao's philosophy. The institutions were to instill Maoist values in
the Chinese society. Through the social and cultural institutions,
individuals would acquire the value of selflessness, which stressed
the virtues of serving the people. The continuous struggle was to
help transform society's individuals into "new socialist men and wo-
men" 2 who were both red and expert.
In contrast to the Maoist concept which stresses the unification
of "red" and "expert," the leaders of Hong Kong place primary
importance upon the expert alone. Maoist political ideology does
not play an important role in Hong Kong. Western economists have
pointed out that Hong Kong's economic policy is based upon classi-
cal liberalism. "[T]he free flow of information, making the dissemi-
nation of international know how possible as well as the attraction
of foreign investors. . ." exemplifies government policy in Hong
Kong.13 By adopting laissez-faire policies, the government believes
that private industry will direct resources in the optimum manner.
Economic policies fostering free competition have established Hong
Kong as a leading economic power in Asia.
Throughout modern Chinese history, both the Nationalists and
the Communists have denounced British imperialism in Hong
Kong. Since 1949, the PRC has made statements that "Hong Kong
is Chinese territory." As a member of the United Nations, China
addressed the Hong Kong issue after a Special United Nations
Committee on Colonialism considered the matter in 1972, and it
listed Hong Kong and Macao as its "colonial territories."' 14 Huang
Han, the Chinese ambassador at that time, asserted the Chinese po-
sition: "Hong Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occu-
pied by the British and Portugese authorities. The settlement of the
questions of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within China's sov-
12. Starr, Conceptual Foundation of Mao Tse-tung's Theory of Continuous Revolution,
11 ASIAN SURVEY 627, 628 (June 1971).
13. HONG KONG: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 9
(1979).
14. J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: A DOCUMEN-
TARY STUDY 383 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COHEN & CHIU].
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ereign right and does not at all fall under the category of colonial
territories."15 Huang Han added that, because the Hong Kong and
Macao issues were domestic Chinese matters, the United Nations
had no authority to address those questions. 16
B. Chinese and British Economic Interests in Hong Kong
Despite the PRC's rhetoric regarding a Chinese solution for
Hong Kong, it remains a free port economic center. The Chinese
are well aware that change in government and ideology could sub-
stantially disturb Hong Kong's economy. In its search for a solu-
tion, the PRC must consider the enormous economic benefit derived
from present-day Hong Kong. Richard Hughes noted in his book,
Borrowed Place Borrowed Time, Hong Kong, "Communist trading
and financial operations are interwoven with Hong Kong govern-
mental and capitalist practice."' 17 In Hong Kong, "commercialized
Communism" has thrived. By using Hong Kong, China "has
learned all the capitalistic gimmicks in sales promotion, advertising,
hire practices, exhibitions and so on. It has mastered the art of
watching the market trends and adjusting prices on the basis of sup-
ply and demand."' 8 As in the pre-opium era, the Chinese desire the
economic benefits of international trade. About one million pounds
sterling flow from Hong Kong to mainland China each day.19
About fifty percent of Hong Kong's food, thirty-three percent of its
petroleum, and thirty-three percent of its water are imported from
the PRC.20 Not only does the PRC value trade with Hong Kong,
but the PRC also owns over "fifty department stores, eight smaller
banks, two insurance companies, three financial syndicates. . . shoe
stores, publishing houses and restaurants" in Hong Kong.21 Thus,
the mainland Chinese have profited from Hong Kong's strong
economy.
Britain also has a substantial stake in the success of the Hong
Kong economy. Michael Parks observed in a recent article about
Hong Kong that the British "approach is not that of give and take,
15. Id. at 384.
16. Id.
17. R. HUGHES, BORROWED PLACE BORROWED TIME, HONG KONG AND ITS MANY
FACES 40 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HUGHES].
18. Id.
19. Id. at 41.
20. Liu, For China's Partner, a Confident Future, FAR EAST ECON. REV. 40 (Sept. 7,
1979).
21. HUGHES, supra note 17, at 41.
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as they claim, but just take-take. Since the end of World War II,
British firms have made a fortune in Hong Kong and hundreds of
billions of dollars have been sent to the mother country."
22
Britain receives substantial economic and trading advantages.
Most important are the large sterling balances kept invested in Brit-
ish government and local authority bonds, as well as short term
loans and cash. 23 This Hong Kong surplus derives from "the accu-
mulated budget surpluses of the Hong Kong government; sterling
assets held by the government's Exchange Fund; and the reserves
owned by Hong Kong banks."' 24 In contrast to "other members of
the sterling area," Hong Kong has been unable to utilize its surplus
for diversification because of British control.
25
In addition to the other economic advantages of "owning"
Hong Kong, British firms have long enjoyed trading advantages
there. For example, Hong Kong's favorable geographical position
facilitates trade with Southeast Asia. And the recent increase in
trade with China has enhanced Hong Konges importance as a center
for Western business. It is an ideal junction for American-Euro-
pean-Chinese business transactions. Additional British advantages
derive from the "many Hong Kong laws, construction codes, utility
regulations and development plans" that contain "buy-British" re-
quirements, despite the fact that "Japanese or American products
might be cheaper or more suitable."2
6
Britain has used Hong Kong both as a means to conduct busi-
ness and as a captive export market. The only major cost to the
British is a fraction of the garrison costs for 8000 occupation troops;
in 1980, Hong Kong paid seventy-five percent of the $332 million
price tag.27 Consequently, considering the problems of the British
economy, Hong Kong remains a very valuable British asset, and
Britain naturally will strive to retain this asset.
III. THE LAW OF TREATIES AND HONG KONG
Article 38 of the statute of the International Court of Justice
enumerates the primary sources of law applicable to international
22. L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
23. N. MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 8 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter cited as MINERS].
24. Id.
25. Grudging Concession, ECONOMIST 78 (June 8, 1968).
26. L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1981, at 6, col. 3.
27. Id.
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disputes: (1) international conventions, whether general or particu-
lar, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(2) customary law; (3) general principles of law; and (4) judicial ex-
pertise. 28 International conventions include treaties and other writ-
ten agreements between states.
To explain the role of treaties, Professor Lauterpacht wrote:
The rights and duties of States are determined in the first in-
stance, by their agreement as expressed in treaties. . . . When a
controversy arises between two or more States with regard to a
matter regulated by a treaty, it is natural that the parties should
invoke and that the adjudicating agency should apply, in the first
instance, the provisions of the treaty in question.
29
Both Britain and China accept the western premise that treaties
are a primary source of international law. In past dealings with its
former colonies, Britain has used treaties as the primary source for
interpreting each nation's legal rights and obligations. Although
some Chinese writers have charged that the use of treaties as a
source of international law is a bourgeois notion, other Chinese
writers state a more traditional view that treaties are "an important
source of international law and an important form of expressing in-
ternational law."3° As members of the United Nations, both Britain
and the PRC adhere to Article 38, which provides that treaties will
be of first importance in resolving any differences between states.
Consequently, despite differing views on international law, resolu-
tion of any dispute in this case would involve an initial analysis of
all applicable treaties.
The Chinese view is that the Hong Kong treaties are "une-
qual," imposed by duress, and hence unenforceable. Before the
1949 Revolution, the western nations, Russia, and Japan had carved
China into "spheres of influence." They took advantage of China's
impotence and imposed onerous, one-sided treaty obligations on the
Chinese. The Chinese claim that the Treaty of Nanking "opened
the gate of China to foreign intrusion," and as a result transformed
China into a "semi-sovereign country."' 3' This claim cannot be dis-
credited easily:
28. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, art. 38, para. I (a)-
(d).
29. L. HENKINS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 579 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HENKINS].
30. COHEN & CHIu, supra note 14, at 74.
31. Liu, Britain's China Policy, CHINA REPORT 40 (Mar./Apr. 1980).
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Whereas the West saw the first treaties as steps in extending Eu-
ropean religion, culture and law to China, as well as economic
expansion into China for western commerce, the Chinese saw the
treaties within the context of their traditional concept of the
world order, and not in terms of a nation state being deprived of
its rights under international law.32
It was not until Chinese translations of Western international
law were published that the Chinese realized the significance of
their loss of sovereignty, inducing a long struggle to end its "une-
qual" position in the world order. The aim of both the Nationalist
and Communist Chinese was to establish China's equality among
states. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in
1949, and the adoption of Marxism, China has continually empha-
sized "mutual respect for sovereignty" as a basic legal principle.
With reference to its "unequal" treaty claim against Britain,
China could assert the principle of rebus sic stantibus. Rebus sic
stantibus applies to treaties when circumstances have changed.
China has used this doctrine to support its position in the past. The
principle of rebus sic stantibus applies "when that state of things
which was essential to, and the moving cause of, the promise or en-
gagement has undergone a material change, or has ceased, [and
then] the foundation of the promise or engagement is gone and their
obligation has ceased." 33 Both China and Britain accept this defini-
tion of rebus sic stantibus.
Generally, a successor state will argue rebus sic stantibus in con-
junction with a duress claim. Thus, China should not seek abroga-
tion of its predecessor state's treaty commitments solely on the basis
of rebus sic stantibus. China also claims that "unequal treaties" or
"treaties of a 'slave nature' can be unilaterally abolished regardless
of whether there has been a vital change of circumstances." 34 The
Chinese argue that because the Sino-British treaties were promul-
gated when China was a semi-sovereign state, they are a product of
duress, and therefore unenforceable.
The Chinese claim that the Opium War is evidence of China's
weakness, and events that followed established China's semi-sover-
32. Ogden, Sovereignty and International Law. The Perspective of the People's Republic
of China, 7 INT'L L. & POL. 1,4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ogden].
33. D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 88 (1967) [hereinafter cited as O'CONNELL].
34. H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES 103
(1972).
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eignty, which existed until 1949. Under the terms of the Treaty of
Nanking, the British were granted extensive trade privileges. The
Chinese were forced to open five ports in China to foreign trade; the
number of these ports expanded throughout the nineteenth century.
Recognizing the opportunities given to Britain, America and France
sought equal treatment. As Victore Hsu explained:
Needless to say, after their defeat in the Opium War the Chinese
were anxious to avoid new confficts. They reasoned that denial
of these requests would drive the American and French to seek
trade under British auspices, in which case the Chinese would
have difficulty distinguishing them, since they all looked alike
and spoke equally unintelligible languages. 35
Consequently, the Chinese signed the Treaty of Wangsia with
the Americans on July 3, 1844, and the Treaty of Whampoa with the
French on October 24, 1844.36 The extraterritorial provisions and
the most-favored-nation clauses contained in these respective trea-
ties were detrimental to China's interests. The Chinese agreed to
the terms "partly out of expediency and partly out of ignorance of
international law and the concept of national sovereignty. ' ' 37
A general rule of international law provides that except for
those granted diplomatic immunity, aliens who enter a State are
subject to that State's jurisdiction and are "responsible to it for all
acts [committed] on its territory." 38 Extraterritorial rights granted
by treaty to the British, Americans, French, and later the Spanish,
Dutch, and Russians violated this general rule. These extraterrito-
rial rights struck a strong blow to China's sovereignty. The foreign
powers rationalized that Chinese law did not conform to Western
modes of thinking and doing business, especially with reference to
"legal incorporation and proceedings for enforcement of con-
tract.' ' 39 As a result, foreigners in China were not subject to Chinese
jurisdiction but rather to their respective countries' consular courts.
The Chinese could file suit against foreign nationals only in these
courts.4o
35. Hsu, supra note 2, at 244.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 244, 245.
38. L. TUNG, CHINA AND SOME PHASES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (1940) [hereinaf-
ter cited as TUNG].
39. J. FAIRBANK, E. REISCHAUER & A. CRAIG, EAST ASIA TRADITION AND TRANS-
FORMATION 576 (1973).
40. Id.
[Vol. 4
Sino-British Treaties
The most-favored-nation clause also worked to China's disad-
vantage. The clause was used as a means to develop freer trade
among nations. However, China grew weaker and lost almost all
control in setting necessary trade restrictions on foreign items. The
Chinese could not protect their own industries and merchants be-
cause of the fixed tariff established by the treaties. The trading
rights and privileges given to one group of foreign nationals were
extended to other groups because of the most-favored-nation clause.
This further impaired China's sovereignty. 41
Foreign settlements thrived, and foreigners restricted Chinese
rights within these areas. Although the Chinese soon recognized the
inequities of the situation, it suffered further losses following its de-
feat in the Sino-Japanese War. Again, there was a scramble for con-
cessions and control. "[T]he competing Powers seized strategic
bases in China, partly as a means to defend their own positions and
possessions in the Far East and partly as a point d'appui for the
exploitation of China. '42 Germany, Russia, France, Japan, Great
Britain, and the United States sought to protect their respective eco-
nomic and political interests. Leases to Chinese territories were
granted to Germany, Russia, and France in 1898. At that time,
Great Britain also obtained the ninety-nine year lease of the New
Territories.
This historical background is intended to give the reader a bet-
ter understanding of China's bitterness towards western imperialism
and exploitation. It further illustrates the lack of respect for China's
sovereignty. China could argue that no nation has experienced such
blatant disregard for its interests as did China after the Opium War.
The leased territories hindered China's own national defense. In
addition, the Chinese delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference
noted, "This assertion of exclusive authority and power. . . made
each concession virtually 'un petit 6tat dans l'6tat', to the impair-
ment of China's right as a territorial sovereign." 43 Both Nationalist
and Communist Chinese have struggled to end China's semi-sover-
eign position among nations. Hong Kong's status as a British "col-
ony" is an unpleasant reminder of China's weakness before 1949.
Rebus sic stantibus could either strengthen or weaken China's
argument. To augment its rebus sic stantibus position as to Hong
41. Id. at 582.
42. M.C. BAU, THE OPEN DOOR DOCTRINE IN RELATION TO CHINA 8 (1923).
43. TUNG, supra note 38, at 26.
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Kong, China could rely both on its duress claim and on the negativ-
ist approach to state succession. The latter theory negates all trea-
ties upon a new state's succession. Discussing the concept of
negativism, Lord McNair explains, "[T]he general principle is that
newly established States which. . . cannot fairly be said to involve
political continuity with any predecessor, start with a clean slate in
the matter of treaty obligations." 44
Using the clean slate negativists' approach, China could assert
that its socialist revolution culminated in a new state which did not
"involve political continuity with any predecessor." As a result,
China would no longer be obligated by the treaties "old" China
made with Britain; the decision would rest with the PRC as to which
treaties were to remain enforceable. The Vienna Convention of
1978 on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties gives support
to this view. Article 16 states:
A newly independent State is not bound to maintain in force, or
to become a party to, any treaty by reason only of the fact that at
the date of the succession of States the treaty was in force in re-
spect of the territory to which the succession of States relates.
45
This lends support to the Chinese claim that the Hong Kong issue is
to be determined by China without reference to the old treaty
provisions.
If China asserts that it is a successor state, will the international
community accept this claim? With the 1949 Revolution, did China.
become a new entity? Chinese official pronouncements state that
this revolution produced a fundamental change in the country's
political, economic, and social system. As Professor O'Connell ex-
plained, "[A] new State may be formed . . by revolutionary
means, and thus with a break in legal continuity. . . .The cases of
the United States, the Spanish American colonies, Greece, Belgium,
Panama and Finland may be regarded as instances of revolutionary
succession . . .46
The Chinese would claim that in establishing the PRC, they
created a new state just as former colonies do when they declare
independence. A state is defined as having the following character-
istics: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a gov-
44. Maloney, Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.- The Vienna Convention of
1978, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 885, 892 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Maloney].
45. Id. at 907.
46. O'CONNELL, supra note 33, at 88.
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ernment; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other
states.4 7 After the 1979 Revolution, the Chinese Communists con-
trolled a permanent population living within a defined territory.
The government is radically different from any preceding govern-
ment, and only the PRC can enter into foreign relations involving
China's territory and resources. Confucian teachings no longer
dominate Chinese society; in its place, communism is taught and
followed. The People's Liberation Army protects China's sover-
eignty. Government institutions and individual lifestyles were fun-
damentally changed with the establishment of the PRC. Since 1949,
nations have "recognized" the PRC and "established" diplomatic
relations with it. In 1971, the members of the United Nations voted
to accept the credentials of representatives of the PRC. Thus, the
four criteria of a state appear to be satisfied.
Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets
forth as grounds for terminating a treaty that: (1) there has been a
fundamental change of circumstances, which was not foreseen by
the parties; (2) those circumstances constitute a basis for consent to
be bound by the treaty; and (3) the change radically transforms the
extent of the treaty obligations still to be performed. 48 China could
possibly enhance its position against Britain with respect to Hong
Kong by using rebus sic stant/bus and duress and state succession
claims.
Inherent in any British response to Chinese claims of duress
and state succession is the principle ofpacta sunt servanda, i.e., that
a treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be performed
in good faith. Pacta sunt servanda is based on the premise that in-
ternational treaties are legally binding "because there exists a cus-
tomary rule of International Law that treaties are binding. '4 9
Professor Lauterpacht stated in his explanation of pacta sunt ser-
vanda that "[tihe binding effect of that rule rests in the last resort on
the fundamental assumption, which is neither consensual nor neces-
sarily legal, of the objectively binding force of International Law." 50
Hence, the treaties would remain valid international obligations, at
least until the burden of establishing their invalidity is borne.
With reference to state succession, the British would probably
47. HENKINS, supra note 29, at 169.
48. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969) art.
62, para. 1 (a)-(b).
49. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 881 (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1948).
50. Id.
1981]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. J[
adopt the universal position: "when a State 'die[s], whether by con-
sent, federation, cession, or disintegration, the successor State as-
sume[s] ioso jure the bundle of rights and duties held by the
predecessor State."5' If a change in sovereignty results in abroga-
tion of international agreements, lawlessness in the international le-
gal order would result. 52 Stability in international law dictates that
successor states be bound by prior treaty commitments. Thus, under
the universalist view, despite the ninety-seven percent reversion of
Hong Kong and the New Territories in 1997, the British would re-
tain control of the island, as well as a small portion of Kowloon due
to the Treaty of Nanking.
Britain could also challenge the facts upon which China relies
to establish rebus sic stantibus. Changed circumstances, lending
support to China's claim to treaty lapse, include the fundamental
political, social, and economic changes which have occurred within
both China and the Far East generally. No longer is China a pitiful
giant, nor Britain an unchallengeable world power. Of course, those
same changes have pulled China and Hong Kong even further
apart. Britain could argue that Hong Kong's governmental and eco-
nomic structures and views are consistent with its social and eco-
nomic realities. The economy thrives under British administration,
and the people have developed compatible attitudes and assump-
tions. These circumstances lend support to Britain's view that
China should not obtain control of any part of Hong Kong.
China has argued rebus sic stantibus in support of its position in
the Sino-Soviet border dispute. In 1964, China declared that all
pre-1917 treaties with Russia were unequal, invalid, and unenforce-
able.53 The Soviet Union insisted onpact sunt servanda in response,
emphasizing that "the historical practice of the inhabitants of the
area" remained unchanged, and consequently that the treaties re-
mained effective. 54 A similar analysis of the "historical practices" of
the Hong Kong "inhabitants" would support the British claim to
continuance of the treaty regime.
The Vienna Convention of 1978 on the Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties supports the Chinese position with reference to
Hong Kong. It reflects the post-World War II concerns of Third
51. Id. at 886.
52. Id. at 891.
53. Chang, Legal Analysis of the Sino-Soviet Frontier Disputes, 3 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 231, 241 (1980).
54. Id.
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World states, decolonization, independence, and political change. 5
Basic to the treaty are "principles of the equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples, of the sovereign equality and independence of
all states, [and] of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
States."56 Under Article 24, a bilateral treaty would remain binding
on a successor state only if (1) the state expressly agreed, or
(2) through its conduct is considered to have agreed to the treaty.5 7
If the PRC is a successor government, Article 24 would apply.
China has expressly denounced the treaties with Britain. If that re-
nunciation is effective, the termination date of the New Territories
lease is irrelevant. It is within China's discretion either to continue
the terms of the treaty even beyond 1997 or to terminate them
before then.
China has the power to cut off Hong Kong island's water sup-
ply in the event of British refusal to relinquish its control. However,
Britain could claim dispositive treaty protection. Dispositive trea-
ties are those which: "(a) are in the nature of objective territorial
regimes created in the interests of one nation or the community of
nations; (b) are applied locally in virtue of territorial application
clauses; [and] (c) touch or concern a particular area of land. ' 58 The
analogy to easements in domestic real estate law is apparent. In the
case of Hong Kong, the focus would not be on the parties to the
treaty, that is, the British government, and the predecessor govern-
ment of the PRC, but rather on the water rights within the territory
itself, i.e., its source in mainland areas.
Even if Britain were successful in protecting the right to a con-
tinued water supply, China could nonetheless isolate the island. A
sovereign state can use its territory freely.5 9 Sovereignty "is funda-
mental to 'peaceful settlement of disputes, observance of treaties,
special privileges and immunities in foreign relations. .' "60 China
would be exercising its sovereignty in a legitimate way if it chose to
isolate the remaining British territory by denying foreign planes and
ships access to its mainland facilities, harbors, and airports. Such
action could effectively render Hong Kong valueless, and despite its
55. Maloney, supra note 44, at 885, 902.
56. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 80/31 (1978).
57. Id. at art. 24, para. 1 (a)-(b).
58. Maloney, supra note 44, at 885, 895.
59. Ogden, supra note 32, at 29, 32.
60. Id. at 32.
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dispositive treaty argument, Britain would be subject to great pres-
sure to yield to Chinese demands.
IV. THE LAW OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
In spite of substantial differences between the Chinese and the
British views on international law and treaties, it is highly unlikely
that China would use force to impose its interpretation. China has
renounced the use of force in international disputes. PRC declara-
tions on peaceful coexistence and the PRC's adherence to the
United Nations Charter as a member state attest to this.
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter states: "All members
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations." 61 Even if Hong Kong were Chinese territory,
the use of force would be "inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." Furthermore, Article 33 provides that parties in-
volved in any dispute endangering "the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by
negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration. . . or
other peaceful means of their choice."' 62 If China employed force,
Britain legitimately could take measures in self-defense. The use of
force would also adversely affect China's position in the United
Nations.
The law of peaceful coexistence is a self-imposed impediment
to an invasion of Hong Kong. The 1954 Sino-Indian Trade Agree-
ment in Tibet set forth five principles regulating relations between
states: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and
sovereignty; (2) nonaggression; (3) noninterference in each other's
internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-
existence. 63 As one Soviet writer noted, "The countries of the social-
ist camp are guided precisely by this principle in their relations with
other countries." 64
Although both China and the Soviet Union accept the law of
peaceful coexistence, since the deterioration in their relationship,
beginning in 1956, the two countries have embarked on separate in-
61. U.N. Charter, 59 Stat. 1031, 1037, art. 2, para. 4.
62. Id. art. 33, para. 1.
63. J. HsIUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS 32, 33 (1972).
64. THE SOVIET IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 16 (H. Baade ed. 1965).
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terpretations. Nikita Khrushchev, at the twentieth Congress, on
February 14, 1956, drastically altered Soviet ideology with his enun-
ciation of peaceful coexistence. In an atmosphere of peaceful coex-
istence, competition between capitalism and socialism would be
economically oriented, and military force would be renounced. The
philosophy of peaceful coexistence enabled the Soviets to avoid a
nuclear war with America and made state-to-state relations possible
with many western countries. This fostered international trade and
economic strength. Khrushchev stated:
When we say that the socialist system will win in the competition
between the two systems-the capitalist and the socialist sys-
tem-this by no means signifies that its victory will be achieved
through armed interference by the socialist countries in the inter-
nal affairs of the capitalist countries. Our certainty of the victory
of communism is based on the fact that the socialist mode of pro-
duction possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of
production .... 65
Mao disagreed with Khrushchev's theory on peaceful coexis-
tence, emphasizing instead the need for continuous revolution and
conflict within the socialist state and internationally, within third
world countries, to root out imperialistic exploitation. Mao believed
that capitalist imperialism was opposed to basic communist values;
hence, destruction of capitalism was critical to the establishment of
peace. Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" policy deviated from a
basic communist tenet that the Chinese Communists adhered to, i.e.,
that war was inevitable for a communist society. Bejing branded
Khrushchev's theory "revisionist." The Soviet Union viewed Chi-
nese imperialism as an offense to communism.
With Mao's death and the ousting of the Gang of Four from
power, much of the rhetoric in China stressing violence and revolu-
tionary struggle abated. Ideology has been put aside and emphasis
placed on industrialization; the Chinese have "opened their doors"
to western capitalist countries such as the United States. This
d6tente and establishment of diplomatic relations marks a radical
shift from Chinese denouncements of the United States during the
1949-1969 period.
Today, the Chinese face economic concerns similar to those of
the Soviets in 1956. Since 1975, Chinese authorities have empha-
65. G. F. HUDSON, R. LOWENTHAL & R. MACFARQUHAR, THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
42 (1961).
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sized China's drive toward "Four Modernizations": agriculture, in-
dustry, science-technology, and defense.66 One writer aptly noted,
"Economic performance is considered by Chinese leaders to be the
key to national security and international legitimacy. ' 67 One very
important example of China's policy shift is the Shanghai Com-
muniqu6, issued during President Nixon's visit in 1972. The Shang-
hai Communiqu6 states:
There are essential differences between China and the
United States in their social systems and foreign policies. How-
ever, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social
systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of re-
spect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-
aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
co-existence. International disputes should be settled on this ba-
sis, without resorting to the use or threat of force.
68
The provisions of the Shanghai Communique clearly indicate
that peaceful coexistence between China and the western powers has
come into vogue.
In 1972, during an "off-the-record" interview between Chou
En-lai and a foreign correspondent, the issue of Hong Kong arose.
Expressing the Chinese position with reference to Hong Kong, Chou
urged negotiations. Under international law, "[a] state must enter
into negotiations when a treaty expire[s]. ' ' 69 Even though the Soviet
Union urged China to take Hong Kong back by force, the Chinese
maintained that it "would not be provoked over Macao or Hong
Kong" because China "would eventually call for negotiations." 70
Current Chinese government policy is similar; it seems clear that the
Hong Kong issue must be resolved peacefully through negotiation.
II. HONG KONG'S RACIAL ISSUE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The third and final legal issue to be discussed here concerns the
status of the Chinese population in Hong Kong. To put this prob-
lem in numerical terms, there are 5,017,200 people in Hong Kong,
66. THE CHINA FACTOR: SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE GLOBAL SCENE 111
(R. Solomon ed. 1981).
67. M. GURTOV & B.M. HWANG, CHINA UNDER THREAT: THE POLITICS OF STRAT-
EGY AND DIPLOMACY 244 (1980).
68. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 14, at 1426.
69. MINERS, supra note 23, at 226.
70. Id.
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ninety-eight percent of whom are Chinese. Of these, only fifty-nine
percent were born in Hong Kong.7' Undoubtedly, many who were
not born in Hong Kong will "marry and raise their own families
and eventually die there." 72 Although they share their parents'
pride in being Chinese, they do not identify with contemporary
China's frugal lifestyle. While their parents may have planned to
stay in Hong Kong just temporarily, those born there of course con-
sider it their home and plan to continue living there.
Fortunately, there have been no direct racial confficts in Hong
Kong. As one study noted, "The white minority lives on top of the
society. But because of their small number, their existence is barely
perceptible in the eyes of the Chinese majority in their daily en-
counters. Also, because of their number, they cannot afford to dis-
criminate against local Chinese. . .. "73 Discrimination in Hong
Kong is not based on race but rather upon wealth. This type of
discrimination relates to and conforms with Hong Kong's focus on
economic achievement.
A good example of the absence of a racial problem between the
Chinese and British is the 1967 riots. During the Cultural Revolu-
tion much of the political fervor in China spread to Hong Kong. In
early 1967, the situation seemed stable; however, in May 1967, the
local communists created industrial disturbances, producing "the
most serious disorders in Hong Kong's history." 74 Even though
China supported the Hong Kong communists in their "struggle,"
the Chinese leadership was disorganized and it did not attempt to
take over Hong Kong.
The strikes and riots were not racially motivated: the demon-
strators, "waving. . . little red books and chanting of the thoughts
of Mao Tse-tung, ' ' 75 focused on political and economic issues. The
changes sought would have affected not only the British system but
also the lives of the many Chinese who benefit from British adminis-
tration. Because most of the police were Chinese, their suppression
of the disturbances did not involve a racial confrontation between
71. THE FAR EAST, supra note 6, at 390.
72. K. HOPKINS, HONG KONG: THE INDUSTRIAL COLONY 40 (1971).
73. HONG KONG: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 137
(1979).
74. Lawrie, Hong Kong and the People's Republic of Chinz Past and Future, 56 INT'L
AFF. 280, 289 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Lawrie].
75. Contemporary Affairs 101 (Presented at U. of Guelph Conference April 1968).
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British and Chinese;76 instead, the conffict was between the authori-
ties and revolutionaries.
Although racial problems in Hong Kong are minimal, in future
negotiations between China and Britain, the status of the people in
Hong Kong will be a key issue. Since 1949, China has shown
marked interest in the Hong Kong Chinese. The mainland authori-
ties consider all Hong Kong Chinese to be citizens of China. Chi-
nese law, which predicates nationality on the doctrine of jus
sanguinis, offers diplomatic protection to those who leave China,
seeking a better economic life abroad. The Constitution of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, adopted in 1954, contains provisions pledg-
ing to protect the rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad.
77
During the nineteenth century, China was beset with many in-
ternal problems, some caused by the Tai'ping Rebellion (1850-64)
and some by western imperialism. The disorders disrupted the lives
of the peasants, and many migrated to Hong Kong. At first, the
Manchu emperors in power strictly followed the tenets of Con-
fucianism; they were very much against Chinese emigration. One
author stated, "The emperors took the view that the loss of subjects
was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages.57 8
With western encroachment in China, the Manchu government suf-
fered great humiliation. The importance of being a Confucian
scholar continued; however, the wealthy self-made man became a
symbol of prestige in southern China. A Chinese who had gone
abroad and made his fortune was a highly respected man upon his
return.
When the Communist Party came to power in 1949, the over-
seas Chinese did not return to China; they began to consider Hong
Kong and other newly settled areas as their homes. However, some
states to which large numbers of Chinese had immigrated felt
threatened. Many Southeast Asians believed that overseas Chinese
were fifth columns in China's effort to spread communism. Al-
though the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution's rhetoric may
lend credence to this view, contemporary Chinese authorities adhere
to the Bundung Conference Principles adopted in 1955. At that
conference, Chou En-lai promised that China would live peacefully
with the Southeast Asian nations despite their different political
76. Lawrie, supra note 74, at 280, 289.
77. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 14, at 752.
78. V. PURCELL, THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 88 (1951).
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systems.7 9
China has sought to resolve its differences with Southeast Asia
diplomatically; a notable example is the "Sino-Indonesian Treaty
on Dual Nationality," signed on April 22, 1955. That treaty
provides:
[Aill persons who hold simultaneously the nationality of the
People's Republic of China and the nationality of the Republic of
Indonesia shall choose, in accordance with their own will, be-
tween the nationality of the People's Republic of China and the
nationality of the Republic of Indonesia.-. . . [In addition,] all
children born in the Republic of Indonesia acquire upon their
birth, the nationality of the People's Republic of China if both
their parents or only their fathers hold the nationality of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China.80
These treaty provisions give one insight into China's position
on nationality and bloodline. They constitute a departure from jus
sanguinis permitting Indonesians of Chinese descent to choose
which citizenship to adopt.
China has expressed its interest as a mother country in protect-
ing overseas Chinese, particularly in Indonesia, Thailand, and more
recently, Vietnam. In Southeast Asia generally, they have been very
successful in business and finance, creating much resentment among
the local populace. Such was the case in Indonesia, where severe
persecution resulted in the late 1960's. The Chinese diplomatic note
of protest asserted in part, "The racist persecution of the Chinese
nationals by the Indonesian right wing reactionary forces ...
grossly violates principles of international relations."'"
China has an interest in protecting the rights of overseas Chi-
nese. The treatment they receive abroad reflects upon China's sov-
ereignty and status. China has stated that it will give those
persecuted people its support and will seek actively to protect their
lives and property. There are two competing interests: (1) respect-
ing the sovereignty of another state, and (2) protecting the welfare of
overseas Chinese. Generally, China will not interfere in a conflict
between a foreign nation and an overseas Chinese resident of that
nation. China respects the sovereign right of other nations to make
79. Wong, The Economics and Policies of Sino-Indonesian Relations, 1950- 76, 5 ASIAN
PROFILE 386 (1977).
80. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 14, at 754, 757.
81. International Legal Materials 775 (1966).
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their own laws and regulations, and overseas Chinese are expected
to obey the rules. However, in instances where persecution against
an overseas Chinese community is great, China will intervene diplo-
matically, as it did in Indonesia.
Determining the nationality of the Hong Kong people poses a
unique problem. The Chinese government has declared that "Hong
Kong is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, and our compatri-
ots in Hong Kong are blood brothers and sisters of the Chinese peo-
ple. The Chinese people cannot possibly turn a deaf ear to the
British imperialists' fascist atrocities of barbarously suppressing our
countrymen in Hong Kong."8 2 China's interest in the people of
Hong Kong is even better grounded than its concern for those of
Indonesia. Hong Kong was previously the territory of China,
whereas no such claim applies to Indonesia.
British citizenship is founded upon both jus soil and jus
sanguinis. On October 30, 1981, the British government enacted the
Nationality Act of 1981,83 producing substantial changes in the ac-
quisition of British citizenship. However, section 4 of the British
Nationality Act of 1948 provides that ". . . every person born
within the United Kingdom.. . shall be a citizen of the United
Kingdom by birth."8 4
One of the major changes in the 1981 Act deals with Britain's
designation: "citizenship by descent." Under provisions of the 1948
Act, British citizenship through descent could be passed on indefi-
nitely upon the child's registration.8 5 The recent law abrogates this
provision, limiting the acquisition of citizenship by descent, from
father or mother, only to the first generation. The reason for this
change was that second and third generations usually have ex-
tremely tenuous connections with the United Kingdom.8 6
The Nationality Act of 1981 requires "a real and close personal
connection with the United Kingdom" to acquire British citizen-
ship.87 This is at variance with the old English doctrine of perpetual
allegiance, established in the fourteenth century.88 Until 1981, the
82. COHEN & CHIu, supra note 14, at 383.
83. The Nationality Act will become effective in 1982.
84. British Nationality Act, 1948 § 4.
85. N. YAAcov, DUAL NATIONALrry 26 (1961).
86. Samuels, British Nationality Law: The Proposed Legislation, 130 N.L.J. 997 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Samuels].
87. Id. at 996.
88. Ekins, Expatriation After Terrazas v. Vance: Right or Retribution?, 19 VA. J. INT'L
L. 109 (1978).
[Vol. 4
Sino-British Treaties
United Kingdom followed this doctrine, preserving the concept that
"[n]o man may abjure his native country nor the allegiance which
he owes to his sovereign. ' 89 The doctrine of perpetual allegiance is
now obsolete.
Another factor in the change of policy is the increasing number
of refugees and immigrants seeking entry to the United Kingdom.
Revolutions and internal strife plague former colonies as well as
others in the third world. Britain has enacted legislation which cre-
ates different categories of citizenship and limits the right of abode
to those born and "belonging" to the United Kingdom. 90
Three types of citizenship within the Commonwealth were cre-
ated by the Nationality Act of 1981: British citizenship, British de-
pendent territories' citizenship, and British overseas citizenship. 91
Under the provisions of this act, those born in Hong Kong possess
British dependent territories citizenship. As one commentator ex-
plained: "They will not have citizenship of their particular colony.
On independence, however, they will acquire citizenship of their
new country and give up their former citizenship. ' 92 Although the
Hong Kong people possess British citizenship, they are not granted
a "right of abode" in the United Kingdom. In addition, when Hong
Kong obtains "independence," the Chinese people in Hong Kong
will lose their British citizenship.
The Nationality Act of 1981 tends to strengthen China's claims
concerning the status of the Hong Kong people. However, China's
interest in its "blood brothers and sisters in Hong Kong" is not re-
ciprocated. A recent survey, conducted in 1981, showed that if
Hong Kong were to revert to China, one-third of the population
would prefer to leave, forty-one percent of them wishing to emigrate
to the United States, twenty-five percent to Canada, and only two
percent to Britain.93 Apparently, the Hong Kong Chinese would not
willingly subject themselves to incorporation into China, despite
their feelings toward the current administration. As a foreign corre-
spondent accurately observed, "The lingering preference of Hong
Kong's Chinese for colonial conditions rather than the Communist
way of life is strictly apolitical and strictly self-centered.
'94
89. Id.
90. Samuels, supra note 86, at 996.
91. Id. at 997.
92. Id.
93. L.A. Times, Apr. 2, 1981, at 7, col. 1.
94. HUGHES, supra note 17, at 177.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Chinese must appreciate that a solution to the Hong Kong
dispute will affect not only British and Chinese interests but also the
interests of other nations, such as the United States. Recognizing
Hong Kong's ideal location for trade with China and Southeast
Asia, many multinational corporations have established themselves
there. A majority of these corporations are American. The foreign
firms have invested $2,114 million in Hong Kong as of February
1979. Nearly forty-five percent of this investment came from the
United States.95 In addition, Hong Kong has exported more goods
to the United States than to any other country, in 1977, HK$13,552
million; in 1978, HK$15,125; and in 1979, HK$18,797. 96
The issue of Hong Kong's future is very difficult to resolve. Ec-
onomically, Hong Kong is dependent upon the Chinese mainland
for water and essentially all of its natural resources, except fish. In
addition, Kai Tak Airport will belong to China in 1997. Maintain-
ing Hong Kong's status quo is of economic value to China. The
mainland government wants the economic advantages Hong Kong
offers, but at what political price? As one scholar noted,
"[e]conomic benefits, foreign exchange earnings and an outlet for
dissident citizens have, inter alia, to be balanced against national
prestige, doctrinal purity and security of regime and state."
97
There are three possibilities as to Hong Kong's future. First,
China could assert complete sovereignty over the island. Despite
Britain's desire to maintain the status quo, there are powerful inter-
national legal arguments in favor of China's claim. The result
might well be a destruction of capitalism as it now exists there.
A second alternative would be for China to administer Hong
Kong under the present economic system, i.e., "to treat the whole
area as a Free Trade Zone and permit the colony to operate in
nearly the same fashion that it does today but with a Chinese rather
than a British governor.'"98 This would permit Hong Kong to con-
tinue as an important economic center in Asia. Although the lais-
sez-faire economic policies of Hong Kong are inconsistent with
communist philosophy, some manipulation of ideas and rhetoric
could perhaps justify it.
95. THE FAR EAST, supra note 6, at 396.
96. Id. at 405.
97. Lawrie, supra note 74, at 280, 283.
98. W. BEAZER, THE COMMERCIAL FuTuRE OF HONG KONG 154 (1978).
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The problem with either option would be the adverse effect of a
"brain drain" from Hong Kong of managers, economic experts, and
planners. As noted in the preceding section, Hong Kong is a very
westernized society. Most of the five million Chinese in Hong Kong
are apolitical; they are primarily economic people. This contrasts
sharply with the basic ideological policies of contemporary China.
Consequently, any complete revision of the political and economic
structures there should involve an effort to retain those with man-
agement skill, and probably a reeducation campaign for those who
voluntarily remain or who are prevented from leaving. Any partial
assumption of control would raise the issue of permitting successful
Chinese businessmen to control the economy. In discussing this
possibility, a commentator observed, "[i]t would be an anomaly
(under the present scheme of things, at least) to permit them to con-
tinue to operate the way that they do and to continue to accumulate
wealth." 99 Should China opt for a partial remedy, undoubtedly
many of the successful Chinese would leave Hong Kong in order to
protect their interests and assets.
The third possibility would be for Hong Kong to continue its
status as a British colony. This would maintain Hong Kong's stabil-
ity, and both China and Britain would continue to receive the eco-
nomic benefits they now enjoy. This position would give China a
lever to employ in negotiating greater concessions from Britain. Al-
though this would be an attractive alternative economically, the phi-
losophy of sovereignty, which China ardently embraces, would
oppose such an election. Basic principles of Maoist ideology, with
its focus on revolutionary commitment and self-reliance, are not
consistent with Hong Kong's self-interested and dependent eco-
nomic status.
It is important for those nations with economic interests in
Hong Kong to remember that China's current policies favoring sta-
ble and moderate development are not a new phase in the Chinese
quest for political, social and economic goals. Although the normal-
ization of relations with Western nations is recent, the emphasis on
experts, industrialists and economic planners is not new; conflicts
have occurred between red revolutionary values and expert techno-
logical planning throughout the post-1949 period, and they may re-
cur. In summation:
China is Communist to be sure, but it is also an aspiring great
99. Id. at 155.
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power, a chauvinistic 'new nation' and the heir to a distinctive
history and cultural style. Our task is to assess these complex
strands as objectively and comprehensively as possible in order to
facilitate what must inevitably be the slow and painful process by
which China and the world adjust their demands upon each
other. We should not caricature the Chinese demands. It will be
difficult enough to deal with reality.
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